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THESIS

**IRREGULAR WARFARE CENTRIC FOREIGN INTERNAL
DEFENSE**

by

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June 2013

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IRREGULAR WARFARE CENTRIC FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Conflict over the past few decades has changed drastically. Warfare changed with the conflict. Large-scale conventional wars are not today's norm. Small non-state actors and terrorist organizations cause havoc on a global scale using unconventional methods and weapons. The United States and its allies need to combat these threats using indirect strategies while maintaining international legitimacy.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

9–11	September 11, 2001
ALP	Afghan Local Police
CMO	Civil Military Operations
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics
FARQ	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
HN	Host Nation
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IW	Irregular Warfare
JP	Joint Publication
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
NIHE	Northern Ireland Housing Executive
NGO	Non-Government Organization
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SA	Security Assistance
SOF	Special Operations Forces
USG	United States Government
USSF	United States Special Forces
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOF	United States Special Operations Forces
VSO	Village Stability Operations

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Conflict over the past few decades has changed drastically, especially in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Warfare changed with the conflicts. Large-scale conventional wars are no longer the norm in today's conflicts. Small non-state actors and terrorist organizations train, operate and supply themselves and then they attack states, armies and alliances in a non-traditional manner. The United States and its allies need to combat these practices in a similar manner while still maintaining legitimacy and abiding by the laws of war and armed conflict.

Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, dated 8 November 2010, defines Irregular Warfare as:

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of militarily and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will.¹

The same publication defines Foreign Internal Defense (FID) as “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to its security.”²

The increased conflict of our allies and their adversaries—Lebanon and Hizbullah,³ Iraq and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Columbia and the Revolutionary Armed

¹ Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington DC: Government Publishing Office, 2010), 170.

² *Ibid.*, 128.

³ Hizbullah will be spelled as such throughout the paper, regardless of author or source. This is consistent with the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* and is done to maintain consistency throughout the paper.

Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC), etc., have tested and strained the training and resources provided by the United States and its allies. Using the tried and true lessons of foreign internal defense, coupled with new methods of training in irregular warfare, the U.S. and allies will be more capable of thwarting attacks from adversaries. The goal of this irregular warfare centric foreign internal defense approach is to make our allies capable and confident of deterring threats in their country and from outside sources.

Lebanon is a small country located in the eastern Mediterranean, bordered in the north and east by Syria, in the west by the Mediterranean Sea and in the south by Israel. Lebanon received its independence from France in 1943, and underwent a civil war from 1975–1990, which devastated the country. Lebanon is almost as big as the state of Connecticut, and has a population of just over four million people.⁴ Based on information from Statistics Lebanon, a Beirut-based research firm, the current population is approximately 54 percent Muslim and 46 percent Christian, and separated into 18 different religious sects.⁵ The three heads of the government come from different religious backgrounds so each sect is represented fairly. Lebanon has a free-market economy worth about 62 billion dollars.⁶

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is comprised of three different branches of service—Army, Navy and Air Force. There are approximately 72,000 active personnel employed by the LAF. The majority of these are in the Army.

Hizbullah is a Shi’a Islamic group that has a political, social and militant wing in Lebanon. Hizbullah in Arabic means “Party of God.” Hizbullah has been active in parliament for many years, and it recently became a recognized

⁴ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, *International Religious Freedom Report 2010*, accessed May 25, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148830.htm>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Lebanon, Central Intelligence Agency fact book, last modified May 7, 2013, <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html>.

member of the Lebanese government in June 2011. Hizbullah can trace its roots back to the 1982 invasion by Israel during the Lebanese Civil War.

This thesis examines a small portion of possible ways to discredit Hizbullah and strengthen the government of Lebanon. In order for Lebanon to discredit and disarm Hizbullah, many complicated and interwoven political, military and economic aspects must be addressed. Lebanon must assume a whole of government approach when dealing with Hizbullah.

The Lebanese government has the critical role in advancing its country's goals and objectives and providing basic services for the population. Hizbullah currently provides an enormous amount of social services support in southern Lebanon to the Shi'a minority. The government needs to assume this role from Hizbullah, ensuring there is no lapse in support. International support and aid is instrumental in kick-starting any social support Lebanon provides to populations under the care of Hizbullah. Lebanon and its allies need to determine effective ways to minimize support Hizbullah receives from countries deemed to be a threat to security and stability, namely Iran and Syria.

The Lebanese military, through rigorous training, needs to increase its effectiveness and professionalism. Security and stability in the southern border region with Israel needs to be assumed from Hizbullah and maintained through robust presence and participation with the Lebanese population residing in the area. The LAF is critical in maintaining security and stability within Lebanon as well as advancing and implementing the policies of the national government.

Hizbullah is deeply embedded within the political, security and economic framework of Lebanon. Hizbullah receives international support from Iran and Syria and provides needed assistance to the minority population. This assistance is well organized and efficient. The militant wing of Hizbullah provides security in the southern border region. The political wing is a recognized element within the government. Hizbullah is very well established and will be difficult to eliminate.

This thesis examines the capabilities needed to produce an effective FID and internal defense and development (IDAD) program to discredit the militant wing of Hizbullah. This program will increase the effectiveness of the LAF and assist it in becoming a more professional military force capable of countering Hizbullah's actions. The FID program, coupled with the IDAD strategy developed by the Lebanese government, has the potential to address other areas within Hizbullah such as social services and support from international partners. Lebanon will not be able to defeat Hizbullah if it continues to receive support from Iran, Syria and the local Shi'a in southern Lebanon. The FID program is one element necessary in the complex solution required to defeat Hizbullah.

B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate current U.S. FID efforts undertaken with foreign allies, and determine if an irregular warfare centric or indirect approach can increase the effects of that nation in combatting its internal and external threats. This thesis specifically evaluates efforts the U.S. takes with Lebanon and Hizbullah.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

Can an irregular warfare-centric foreign internal defense program increase the effectiveness of the Lebanese Armed Forces to counter Hizbullah?

D. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

From personal experience working with the Lebanese Armed Forces, I understand the kinds of problems preventing the LAF from effectively countering Hizbullah. Most units conducting FID with the LAF implement an infantry-based or conventional approach to training. The training is conducted this way because the Lebanese units operate under the rules of the laws of war and deploy using traditional and conventional infantry tactics. Hizbullah does not operate in a

traditional manner. The United States classified Hizbullah as a terrorist organization, and most terrorist organizations follow their own credo and modus operandi.

During previous training missions, the primary objective for the United States Special Forces (USSF) team members has been to train as many soldiers as possible in the allotted time. Selected team members conducted a preliminary meeting with the Lebanese commanding officer prior to the completion of mission planning and team deployment. During the mission planning with the unit's commander, he made it clear his primary objective was to train as many men as possible. His follow-up concern was how many rounds and what types of ammunition we would supply for the training event. The commanding officer requested regular reports on the level of training and the number of rounds of ammunition that his men were firing. This prevented the USSF team from conducting training which focused on more indirect ways to counter the threats, specifically Hizbullah, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could encounter.

Hizbullah is a strong and effective organization operating within Lebanon. It has an established command and control hierarchy, separate military, social services and political sections and benefits from international support from Iran and Syria. Max Weber says, "A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."⁷ Based on this statement, Hizbullah is preventing the LAF from defending and protecting the interests of Lebanon, ultimately preventing Lebanon from exercising its sovereign right to statehood. This thesis will examine ways foreign internal defense efforts undertaken by USSF soldiers can be expanded to increase the effectiveness of the LAF and its allies against threats which undermine the essence of Lebanese statehood.

⁷ Max Weber, "Politics As A Vocation," (lecture, Free Students Union, Munich University, January 1919), retrieved from <http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf>

E. SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW

The research for this thesis was conducted in three areas: Lebanon and Hizbullah, FID and asymmetric conflict and historical case studies. The research established a baseline understanding of the history, problems (social, economic, political, etc.) and previously- implemented programs by Lebanon and Hizbullah.

Richard Norton and Judith Harik's books on Hizbullah provided the majority of the information used to understand and frame Lebanon and Hizbullah's complicated and intertwined histories. As pre-eminent authors on the subject, the books provided a great deal of depth and specifics with regards to the creation of Lebanon and Hizbullah and the military, political and social conflicts plaguing the two elements. Both authors provide a detailed recounting of the original birth of Hizbullah and the players and members associated with the creation and maintenance of the organization throughout the years. Military conflicts and political victories and defeats are outlined using the international events of the Levant and greater Middle East for additional emphasis and background. The authors focus heavily on the vital social service wing of Hizbullah, which provides support to the local Shi'a minority, support the Lebanese government has been slower to provide.

James Love focused his writing and research on the social services capability of Hizbullah. His argument claims, the socials services provided by Hizbullah is most important. The arm of Hizbullah provides critical services, such as food, clean water, access to medical facilities, education, etc., to the improvised and minority Shi'a populations of southern Lebanon. Without these critical services, Hizbullah would not have the base of support and unhindered access to the population it needs to remain relevant and successful within Lebanon and the Levant.

Andrew Mack, Ivan Arreguín-Toft and Patricia Sullivan focus their independent research on how big nations lose wars against small states or non-state actors. Mack concludes conventional military superiority does not

necessarily prevail in modern war and success for the insurgents stems from the withering political support and capability to wage war by the big nation.⁸ Arreguín-Toft concludes strong actors (or big states) lose when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversary. The proper strategy, whether it is direct (attacking an adversary's armed forces and capacity to fight), or indirect (attacking an adversary's will to fight), must be employed by the strong actor in order to ensure victory.⁹ Sullivan concluded strong states lose when they underestimate the cost of attaining war aims and initiate conflicts they cannot sustain to victory.¹⁰ This research all points to the same general conclusion: in order for a strong nation to defeat a weaker nation or non-state actor, the stronger nation must implement a strategy, direct or indirect, focusing on the strengths of the adversary, while simultaneously maintaining popular public opinion for the conflict.

Joint Publication 3-22 (FID) is the current U.S. doctrine on FID, which is intimately linked to the IDAD strategy. A proper IDAD strategy, included in a comprehensive FID training regime, is crucial for successful U.S. training programs with foreign allies and combating small-state and non-state actors through indirect means.

In the case study chapter, the thesis relied heavily on Louise Richardson and Thomas Henriksen for the information on Britain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Scott Mann for the information on Afghanistan and the Village Stability Operations (VSO). Initially, the British combated the IRA using an intense heavy-handed approach. This was unsuccessful and led to the Bloody Sunday massacre in 1972. Following the massacre, the British changed their tactics and focused on addressing the grievances of the Catholics, namely in

⁸ Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" *World Politics*, 27. (Jan 1975): 177.

⁹ Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 105

¹⁰ Patricia Sullivan, "Who Wins? Determinants of strategic success and failure in war" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 2, 2013).

political, employment, housing and educational areas. This indirect approach, coupled with negotiations between both parties, led to a peace agreement and the disarming of the IRA.

In Afghanistan, USSF implemented a bottom-up approach to combating the Taliban. The soldiers lived with and protected the Pashtun population living in remote villages far removed from the central government in Kabul. USSF are able to bring stability to the region by training and employing local Afghan police forces and re-establishing the local elders to their positions of authority within the villages. This bottom-up approach is contradictory to the top-down approach higher levels of U.S. government and military are attempting to implement with the central government. Both approaches are necessary and stability and security are attained when the two approaches are implemented simultaneously and meet in the middle. Conditions necessary for VSO to succeed are outlined in a later chapter, but it should be noted that VSO is not universally successful in Afghanistan.

Using these sources of expertise, it is the intention of this thesis to expand upon previous thoughts of asymmetric conflict and examine the indirect approach to countering Hizbullah. A close comparison will be made to the two case studies and parallels will be drawn connecting the conflicts. Recommendations for how the LAF can marginalize Hizbullah will be presented at the end of the thesis.

F. METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses a case-study methodology to demonstrate how the U.S. can use a more effective approach to countering Hizbullah's influence in Lebanon. Current FID and IDAD concepts the United States is using to train foreign allies will be carefully analyzed in an attempt to incorporate irregular warfare (IW) doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures into FID implementation strategies.

Analysis of historical case studies where an indirect approach was used against an adversary is also conducted. These approaches will be weighed

against current FID doctrine. The goal is to increase the capabilities of the units receiving this enhanced FID training in order to be more effective in countering and combatting internal and external threats to the state. Specifically, what capabilities are more likely to propel the Lebanese government and armed forces towards victory against Hizbullah?

G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

Chapter II conducts a study of Lebanon and Hizbullah. Chapter III evaluates ways to counter Hizbullah and reviews the current U.S. FID and IDAD concepts. Chapter IV reviews the case studies of Great Britain and the IRA and Afghanistan and VSO, where an indirect approach was successful. Chapter V offers recommendations and concluding remarks.

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II. HIZBULLAH

In order for Lebanon, to counter Hizbullah, it will have to take an indirect approach in its efforts. Hizbullah has a long history in Lebanon and is deeply rooted within the political and social framework of the country. The following chapter briefly reviews the contemporary histories of Lebanon and Hizbullah.

A. LEBANON

During the 1920s, the French exploited their League of Nations mandates and carved generous chunks of Syria to create a “greater Lebanon.” Lebanon remained this way until 1943 when it won its independence from France. The Maronite Christians, the favored ally of political and economic France, had to contend with Lebanon being an Arab state and not an appendage of Europe.¹¹ There are 18 recognized sects within Lebanon with the three most populous being the Maronite Christians, the Sunni Muslims and the Shi’a Muslims. The three highest political positions in the Lebanese government are held by these three popular sects—presidency to the Maronites, premiership to the Sunnis and speakership of the parliament to the Shi’a. These positions were based on the last official census conducted in Lebanon in 1932.¹²

The more powerful Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims lived in the high-end neighborhoods of Beirut and the fertile and economically prosperous areas of northern Lebanon. The poorer and more disadvantaged Shi’a lived in the southern slums of Beirut, the southern lands of Lebanon next to Israel and the Beqaa Valley. This geographic divide exasperated the division between the sects that had wealth and advancement opportunities and those that did not. Poverty, despair and resentment flourished in the areas where the Shi’a population resided. Throughout the period from independence to the civil war, the

¹¹ Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah, A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 11.

¹² *Ibid.*, 11–12.

Shi'a population grew and worked mostly as subsistence farmers. The average size of a Shi'a family quickly outpaced that of their rival sects, the Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians.¹³ This increase in population and resentment towards other sects paved the way for the emergence of fundamental Shi'a organizations determined to implement change in the society, country and region.

B. RISE IN SHI'A ACTIVISM AND THE BEGINNING OF HIZBULLAH

Several factors influenced the increase in activism among the Shi'a including: larger families, increased numbers of Palestinian refugees flooding into southern Lebanon after the creation of Israel in 1948, and armed guerrillas from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) who came to Lebanon in large numbers after being expelled from Jordan following the 1970–71 “Black September” events.¹⁴ These were just a few factors which ultimately led to the political rise of the Shi'a within Lebanon and their interaction with neighboring countries.

Throughout the 1950–1970s, young Shi'a men and women were attracted to secular opposition parties (e.g., Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Lebanese Communist Party) for the promise of radical change within Lebanon and the region. This movement towards radical change continued right up until the start of the civil war in 1975, with other opposition parties such as Amal (1974) and Hizbullah (1982), being the late arrivals to the resistance movement. Instrumental in this change was Musa al-Sadr. Known as Imam Musa, he was vocal in increasing the rights, privileges and quality of life for ordinary Shi'a and reducing the power of the traditional Shi'a elites. Imam Musa was also keenly aware of the Maronite Christian's insecurity and their need to maintain the monopoly hold on

¹³ Norton, *Hezbollah, A Short History*, 13.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

the presidency. He was critical of the Christian community and he argued that the Maronite-dominated government neglected southern Lebanon where a majority of the Shi'a lived.¹⁵

On June 5, 1982 Israel crossed the border into southern Lebanon and invaded the country following an 11-month ceasefire with the PLO. This invasion, coupled with the growing Shi'a resentment within Lebanon and the Islamic Revolution exported from Iran gave birth to Hizbullah and their resistance elements. Iran is credited with the creation of Hizbullah. Syria and Iran allied in 1980 with each country mutually benefiting from the relationship and as such Syria did not oppose the creation of Hizbullah. The emulation of the Islamic Revolution and the increased monetary and military support from Iran ensured they were the primary backers of Hizbullah.¹⁶

Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah's Secretary-General, was 22 years old when Hizbullah was founded in 1982. He (and other members of the young cadre of leaders) maintained momentum for the organization through the early 1980s, rising throughout the ranks and gaining more prominence throughout the years. It was not until the latter half of the 1980s that Hizbullah existed as a coherent organization. Throughout this time, Hizbullah maintained close ties with the al-Asad regime in Damascus and the religious leadership in Iran.¹⁷

C. HIZBULLAH'S STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

Hizbullah is organized into a higher headquarters and is supported by three branches—political, military and social. The Israeli invasion of 1982 created the need for a structured resistance organization. Hizbullah based its organization on Mao's three phases of guerrilla war. The first phase was building and maintaining popular support, which equates to the social services section. The second phase is the engagement in guerrilla warfare to resist the oppressor,

¹⁵ Norton, *Hezbollah, A Short History*, 14–19.

¹⁶ Ibid., 32–33.

¹⁷ Ibid., 34–35.

which equates to the military section. The third phase is the execution of a political and military campaign to complete the conquest, which equates to the political section.¹⁸ Love writes, “In 2004, Hizbullah’s Deputy Secretary General, Shaykh Naim Qassem, categorized the organization’s vision into the three pillars of Hizbullah: Islam as a model for governance, the obligation of jihad and the jurisdiction of the jurist theologian or velayat-i faqih.”¹⁹ Hizbullah has changed its ideological platform over the years to maintain its relevancy within Lebanon and the greater Levant region. Initially, the organization was focused on military and social activities. Throughout the years, and in response to the evolving conflicts, Hizbullah increased its political power and representation in local government. Social services continued to increase and military actions adjusted due to the threats. Hizbullah altered its ideology after its inclusion on the U.S. terrorist organization list and most recently again after its inclusion into the Lebanese parliament in June 2011.

Arguably, the most important section within Hizbullah is the social services section, though it is often overshadowed by the actions of the militant wing. Early in Hizbullah’s existence it was shown that the members of this fundamentalist organization truly cared for the disadvantaged Shi’a population. The organization provides food, clean water, medical care, building and infrastructure construction and reconstruction daily and quickly after periods of conflict. The organization caught the world’s attention after the 2006 war when it provided immediate assistance to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts without the knowledge or assistance of the Lebanese government. “Waiting for the state to come has proved futile” said, Abu Mahdi, an engineer from the Jihad al-Binaa Development Group (a Hizbullah organization).²⁰ Hizbullah owes much of its appeal to its ability to provide faster and more services in Muslim areas. This is used as a

¹⁸ James B. Love, *Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power*, Joint Special Operations University Report 10–5 (Tampa, FL: The Joint Special Operations University Press, 2010), 17–18.

¹⁹ Ibid., 2.

²⁰ Ibid., 23.

means to underline and enhance its legitimacy as a political organization rather than trying to change Lebanon's pluralist system.²¹ Hizbullah has created organizations focusing on the welfare of people killed, wounded, or martyred while fighting Israel such as the Martyr's Foundation, Foundation for the Wounded and Women's Association. They have founded youth organizations, such as Imam al-Mahdi Scouts and have successfully marginalized the Lebanese Department of Education with its own education branch.²²

It is estimated that social services account for more than 50 percent of Hizbullah's annual budget, with Iran suspected of contributing hundreds of millions of dollars annually to support the social services section in addition to weapons and training for the military wing.²³ Hezbollah has an extensive network of legitimate business to match Syrian and Iranian funds; however, the expectations of the population could be Hizbullah's ruin if they cannot provide the required support. Hizbullah raises additional income from expatriate populations, illegal activity and charity organizations.²⁴

D. HIZBULLAH'S USE OF VIOLENCE AND ITS REBUTTAL

During the 1980s, Israel and Lebanon continued to have cross-border altercations while the civil war within Lebanon raged on. Hizbullah increased its use of violence resulting in increased civilian and military deaths. Because of the violence, the political agenda of Hizbullah was called into question by the United States, other Western countries and countries throughout the Middle East. The violence perpetrated against the United States and French installations in Lebanon during this time was unsettling to most Christians and Muslims based on ethical grounds. Shadowy Shiite fundamentalist groups claimed responsibility for these acts of violence; Hizbullah never claimed responsibility directly.

²¹ Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah, The Changing Face of Terror* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004), 81.

²² Love, *Hezbollah: Social Services*, 24–25.

²³ Ibid., 27

²⁴ Ibid., 27–28.

However, French and American intelligence claimed Hizbullah, backed by Iran, was responsible for the terror attacks, but no concrete evidence was ever produced or presented to solidify the claim. Portions of society in Lebanon thought Hizbullah and other Shiite fundamentalist groups were positioning themselves to force an Islamic political agenda onto the multi-confessional society.²⁵ Understanding the ramifications of these claims, and the direction public perception was heading, Hizbullah sent an open letter to a Beirut newspaper in 1985 outlining its position.

The letter presented major policy positions for military and political jihad based on Hizbullah's point of view. Harik wrote, "A close reading of the missive illustrated that Hizbullah expressed moderate political goals at the very same time as maximum efforts were being made to mobilize Shiites around a radical Islamic Agenda."²⁶ The letter was divided into four parts—identity, struggle, objectives and a 'word to the Christians.' It claimed that Hizbullah was not a closed organization, but a society linked to the Muslims of the world. The letter claims the United States is the major "abomination" along with its allies and the aims of its jihad are expelling the Americans and its allies from Lebanon and punishing the Christians for crimes committed against the Christians and Muslims during the civil war.²⁷ The letter continues to say, the superpowers of the world and the government of Lebanon were corrupt and Hizbullah fought under the banner of Islam. Hizbullah did not dictate a precise political design for Lebanon, instead saying that once the infidels have been removed from the country the people would be free to choose a political system without any outside pressure. Hizbullah hoped the political system would be Islamic-based or even clerical in nature. The letter also addressed the use of violence by Hizbullah as,

²⁵ Harik, *Hezbollah, The Changing Face*, 64–65.

²⁶ Ibid., 66.

²⁷ Ibid., 66–67.

“each of us is a combat soldier when the call of jihad demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance within his lawful assignment.”²⁸

As the violence continued in Lebanon in the 1980s, Hizbullah was referred to as a terrorist organization more frequently and was placed on the United States terrorist list in 1997, when the list was created. Hizbullah continued to define its role in Lebanon with regards to Syria, Israel and Amal. Hizbullah denies conducting the attacks that killed American, French and Lebanese civilians, but were not upset when foreign forces and individuals departed Lebanon.

In 1989, Saudi Arabia negotiated a peace accord to end the Lebanese civil war, which became known as the Ta’if accord. This accord brought the civil war to a close and re-arranged the political basis in the Parliament with a 50–50 split between the Muslims and the Christians. The accord also called for Lebanon to take control of southern Lebanon from Israel. Hizbullah maintained its military posture by calling its forces “Islamic resistance” groups- not militias- which were committed to ending Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon.²⁹ Continued conflict persisted between Israel and Hizbullah throughout the 1990s and during the eventual 2000 withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon. Hizbullah remained active in the security zone to protect southern Lebanon and prevent any altercations between Lebanon, Israel and the South Lebanon Army, based on the pretext the withdrawal was never fully completed.³⁰ Hizbullah had to be careful during this time period to ensure they were not labeled as terrorists or aggressors, but as a legitimate resistance force committed to the removal of Israel from southern Lebanon.³¹ The Lebanese people were supportive of Hizbullah during this time due to the added security and social services Hizbullah provided, as well as support they received from Syria. The analysis of political affiliations of members of the Lebanese government from 1992–2000 revealed

²⁸ Norton, *Hezbollah, A Short History*, 37–39.

²⁹ Ibid., 83.

³⁰ Ibid., 88–89.

³¹ Harik, *Hezbollah, The Changing Face*, 125–126.

that the men were highly reliable Syrian allies.³² Hizbullah, since then, maintained the support of the local Shi'a, but have alienated itself from other religious sects not in line with its ideology.

E. HIZBULLAH AND THE CURRENT GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Hizbullah returned to the public spotlight in 2001. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9–11), President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 detailing the actions necessary to defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Hizbullah was not on the list of terrorist organizations with a “global reach,” and this angered Israel. Eventually, the directive was amended to include Hizbullah as an enemy in the “war against terrorism.”³³ Hizbullah has its own agenda, mostly a domestic one. It includes the removal of Israel from southern Lebanon and the removal of Western influence from the Middle East. Hizbullah does have some operations occurring elsewhere, but the majority is within the Levant. This small footprint did not cause alarm for the U.S. government after 9–11. After pressure from Israel, Hizbullah was included in the list of terrorist organizations outlined in Executive Order 13224. The United States wanted global support, to include Muslim support, for its impending actions in the global war. Groups such as al-Qaeda have cells located in many countries and the United States wanted to ensure the best possible outcome from the conflict.

Countries were presented with demands and Lebanon, Iran and Syria were no different—essentially sovereign nations are allies of the United States or they are not. Some of the demands were met and some were not. All three countries needed the support Hizbullah provided to maintain pressure on Israel. They considered Hizbullah to be a resistance organization similar to those that fought against colonialism. The Geneva Convention of 1949 gave a country the right to resist a foreign occupation force. Lebanon claimed Hizbullah was just that resistance force and would not freeze its bank assets to appease the United

³² Harik, *Hezbollah, The Changing Face*, 46.

³³ Norton, *Hezbollah, A Short History*, 71–76.

States. Israel claimed they are not occupiers but protectors, protecting their border from incursions. Israel said it would leave the security zone if the Lebanese Army took over security and disbanded Hizbullah.³⁴

Hizbullah maintained its security posture in southern Lebanon in the early 2000s, and tried to distance itself even further from the United States' crosshairs on the verge of the U.S.-led Iraqi invasion.³⁵ Hizbullah made an early strategic decision to exclude acts of terror and violence against civilians and civilian infrastructure when conducting operations. This prevented them from immediately being branded a terrorist organization. Hizbullah has maintained true to this conviction by conducting guerrilla warfare, wearing uniforms and attacking military targets. Attacking civilian targets and infrastructure would not advance their political agenda or jihad against Israel.³⁶ In reality, Hizbullah has not been 100 percent true to this decision, but they strive to maintain their position. Hizbullah has been able to achieve some of their goals and advance others due to this commitment.

According to JP 1-02 terrorism is defined as, "The unlawful use of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political."³⁷ Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter define terrorism as, "The use of violence against civilians by non-state actors to attain political goals."³⁸ Hizbullah claims it is not a terrorist organization, but rather a resistance force within Lebanon. The United States and some, not all, of its allies claim Hizbullah to be a terrorist organization. Terrorists and terrorist organizations, by design, are normally weaker—politically, financially and militarily—than their opponent. To achieve their goals, the terrorists use different

³⁴ Harik, *Hezbollah, The Changing Face*, 163–165.

³⁵ Norton, *Hezbollah, A Short History*, 119.

³⁶ Harik, *Hezbollah, The Changing Face*, 168.

³⁷ Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02*, 332.

³⁸ Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security* 31, no 1 (2006): 52.

strategies. In the end, terror, acts of violence and intimidation all play a crucial role in attaining their goals. In response to this, the United States must understand the root causes of the problem and develop ways to combat and eliminate the threat.

Hizbullah, though weaker than Israel, did well in the 2006 war and is arguably stronger than the Lebanese government in certain areas. Hizbullah enjoys a strong base of support through its robust social services section and the security it provides along the border with Israel. Hizbullah is also active in the Lebanese political system and has been for decades. Hizbullah's stated objectives include the establishment of a Shiite theocracy in Lebanon, the destruction of Israel and the elimination of Western influences from the Middle East.³⁹ In 1992, Hizbullah sent a clear message it had changed its radical course and was abiding by the time-honored rules of the Lebanese electoral game. They campaigned with and against Amal depending upon the restrictions placed on them by Beirut and Damascus. Hizbullah knows it needs to maintain its base of radical supporters, but it must also be practical and garner the support of the political elites currently in power. It is stated that Hizbullah's internal coercion ended with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, but the ideals of the jihad are still strong within the organization. Hizbullah's objectives will be accomplished through a political and military strategy as time moves forward.⁴⁰ The Lebanese population continues to elect members of Hizbullah to political positions solidifying its legitimate resistance role and degrading its terrorist label. Hizbullah continues to win the majority of the party bloc seats in legislative chamber and presses forward with their political jihad.⁴¹

The pressing argument is whether Hizbullah should be classified as a terrorist organization or a resistance organization. As previously mentioned,

³⁹ START, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism, *Terrorist Organization Profile: Hezbollah*, accessed May 25, 2013, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3101

⁴⁰ Harik, *Hezbollah, The Changing Face*, 51–56.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 147–151.

Hizbullah and its allies claim it is a resistance force, determined to wage a jihad against Israel and the United States. According to Hizbullah, when Israel is evicted from Lebanon, the population can choose what form of government it wants.

The United States and Israel have a different view on the situation. Though the U.S. has not provided any proof of the attacks, they claim Hizbullah, backed by Iran, conducted the bombings and kidnappings in the 1980s. The United States often references Imad Mugniyeh and his role as a master terrorist for Hizbullah. The United States claim he was involved in everything from smuggling to the kidnappings and TWA hijackings.⁴² Israel also placed pressure on the United States to add Hizbullah to the presidential directive after 9–11. Israel was fighting the Palestinian Intifada and did not want to fight on a second front. By labeling Hizbullah a terrorist organization and placing it in the directive, Lebanon could be persuaded to dismantle it and freeze its monetary support and assets. Lebanon decided to use international laws and loopholes to circumvent the demands of the United States and maintain its support for Hizbullah.⁴³

Language and wording are vital. David C. Rapoport wrote about language in his second wave of modern terrorism, “Second-wave organizations understood that they needed a new language to describe themselves because the term terrorist has accumulated so many negative connotations that those who identified themselves as terrorists incurred enormous political liabilities.”⁴⁴ Hizbullah needed to shun the label of terrorist organization and embrace the label of resistance force. Fighting its jihad against Israel and safeguarding the population as best as it could assist in defending its preferred label in the global arena.

⁴² Harik, (2004)

⁴³ Ibid., 179–181.

⁴⁴ David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism”, in *Attacking Terrorism*, ed. A.K. Cronin and J. Ludes, 46–73 (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press), 67.

F. HIZBULLAH'S CURRENT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Currently, Hizbullah is playing a vital role in Lebanon and the Middle East. Hizbullah is active, politically connected with Syria and Iran and has a strong financial backing from Iran. Hizbullah will continue to defend the southern border, protecting the population and attacking Israel when necessary. As long as Hizbullah maintains the support of the local population, Shi'a and others, to include some Christians, it has the ability to remain relevant. In order to remove Hizbullah's relevancy from the area the Lebanese government must take control of the security and social services situation. The government deployed forces to southern Lebanon in the past however; results were more favorable with the Hizbullah fighters. Hizbullah does not have the level of bureaucracy and resistance the government has when dealing with deployments, allocation of money and services. It is for these reasons Hizbullah is able to provide for the population faster and more efficiently than the government. The leaders of parliament also know this and are not willing to upset the status quo within the area.

The next chapter focuses on several topics, ultimately providing a framework for an indirect approach to countering Hizbullah. Asymmetric conflict, how large and small nations and organizations win and lose wars and the U.S. FID and IDAD will also be examined.

III. COUNTERING HIZBULLAH

The previous chapter discussed Hizbullah from its creation until the present, focusing on the political, military and social aspects of the organization. This chapter will focus on asymmetric conflict and the need for Lebanon and its allies to take an indirect approach against Hizbullah in order to counter it and eventually render the militant wing irrelevant within the region.

A. ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

JP 1–02 defines asymmetric as the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, capabilities and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths while exploiting its capabilities.⁴⁵

Andrew Mack in, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," observes conventional military superiority does not necessarily prevail in modern warfare. It is also important to note that according to Mack, the large conventional armies did not win militarily, but they did not lose militarily.⁴⁶ Success for the insurgents arose not from a military victory, but from a progressive attrition of their opponents' political capability to wage war. FID, when closely coupled with a strong IDAD program, will provide the capabilities to a host nation to combat the organizations threatening the sovereignty of the state.

Mack provides three reasons why the United States lost in the Vietnam War. These reasons are not solely associated with Vietnam. The reasons can be used for any conflict where there are stronger and weaker combatants. First, superiority in military power (conventionally defined) does not always guarantee victory; it may, under certain circumstances, be counterproductive. Second, the Vietnam War demonstrated how under certain conditions the theater of war extends beyond the battlefield to encompass the policy and social institutions of

⁴⁵ Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication, 1–02*, 27.

⁴⁶ Mack, "Why Big Nations," 177.

the external power. This includes destroying the political capability or political will of the external power. This, according to Mack, is the most important factor with which the insurgents must be concerned. Third, Mack references Mao's protracted warfare ideals including the external power's willingness to absorb costs—both blood and treasure—and the notion that the guerrilla wins if he does not lose.⁴⁷

Mack notes rather strongly and repeatedly, if the will and political capability of the people supporting the external power are destroyed, then it does not matter how strong the military is; it becomes irrelevant.⁴⁸ Mack lays out some of the factors necessary for the insurgents to avoid defeat, including retaining a minimum degree of vulnerability; imposing a steady accumulation of costs on the opponent; provoking the external power into escalating its efforts on the ground ultimately decreasing the political capability and will of the population; and imposing direct costs to the external power—troops killed and treasure expended. The direct costs become of strategic importance when they are translated into psychological and political indirect costs. Applied to this thesis, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the utility of FID can be enhanced by systemically incorporating political and psychological aspects of asymmetric conflict.

Similarly, Ivan Arreguín-Toft discusses his theories of asymmetric conflict in his article, "How the Weak Win Wars," specifically the best predictor of asymmetric conflict outcomes is selecting the appropriate strategic interaction.⁴⁹ The author outlines the following ideal strategies—strong actors and their attack strategy of direct attack and barbarism and weak actors and their defensive strategy of direct defense and guerrilla warfare strategy.⁵⁰ Arreguín-Toft builds upon Mao arguing, "potential strategies and counterstrategies can be reduced to

⁴⁷ Mack, "Why Big Nations," 177–178.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 179.

⁴⁹ Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win," 95.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 100.

distinct, ideal-type strategic approaches: direct and indirect.” Direct approaches target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary’s capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an adversary’s will to fight.⁵¹

Arreguín-Toft discusses four hypotheses related to strategic interaction and conflict outcomes.⁵²

1. Direct attack versus direct defense—“when strong actors attack using a direct strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should win quickly and decisively.”
2. Direct attack versus indirect defense—“when strong actors attack with a direct strategy and weak actors defend using an indirect strategy, all things being equal, weak actors should win.”
3. Indirect attack versus direct defense—“when strong actors attack using an indirect strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all things being equal, strong actors should lose.”
4. Indirect attack versus indirect defense—“when strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak actors defending with a guerrilla warfare strategy, all things being equal, strong actors should win.”

Arreguín-Toft concludes his article with, “strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversaries.” Based on the four hypotheses above, if strong actors implement same approach interactions they should win while opposite approach interactions favor weaker actors.⁵³ The overall implication of strategic interaction is highly pertinent to FID as it can highlight the necessity for matching strategies in order for government forces to counter insurgents.

Patricia Sullivan discussed reasons why strong states win or lose against small states or non-state actors. She argues strong state lose to small states because of a lack of political will or resolve, domestic policy constraints such as inappropriate strategies or an inappropriate use of force.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win,” 105.

⁵² Ibid., 107–109.

⁵³ Ibid., 121–122.

⁵⁴ Sullivan, “Who Wins?”

Sullivan hypothesized strong states lose small wars when they underestimate the cost of attaining their war aims and initiate conflicts they cannot sustain. She said when two randomly paired states are engaged, the stronger state will win because of the placement of military capabilities at the forefront of conflict. Conversely, when states evaluate each other based on national interests—diplomacy, information, military and economics (DIME)—prior to conflict the outcome could favor either the strong or weak state based on the dismissal or exploitation of those national interests.⁵⁵ According to Dr. Sullivan, there are three paths to victory:

1. Render the opponent physically incapable of maintaining an organized offense or defense (military victory).
2. Convince the opponent it will eventually be rendered incapable of fighting.
3. Convince the opponent the cost of victory will be greater than the price it is willing to pay, (this is how weak states win).⁵⁶

The strong state wages war based on the destructive capacity of their military while weak states choose to wage war based on their cost tolerance. The destructive capacity of a military relates to the physical effects an actor can produce given the available resources. Cost tolerance is the extent of human and material costs an actor is willing to absorb. Strong states choose war when the destructive capacity advantage will allow them to destroy their opponent's capacity and/or will to fight at an acceptable cost. Weak states choose war when they are willing to absorb any cost their opponent can impose, or impose enough damage, politically and militarily, to convince their opponent the cost of war is a greater price than it is willing to pay.⁵⁷

When dealing with the typology of political objectives (Figure 1), war can range from brute force to coercive. Traditionally, wars were fought over power and resources, regime change and the defense and seizure of territory, but these

⁵⁵ Sullivan, "Who Wins?"

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

are becoming less frequent. Wars are coercive in nature and fought for political, military, religious and cultural reasons, in addition to intangible reasons such as policy change and compliance.⁵⁸ War is more likely to be fought when the cost is underestimated opposed to overestimated. If the cost of war could be identified prior to the outbreak of hostilities, fewer wars would be fought. The increase in tolerance for the war by the weaker states increases as the time and cost of the war increases. Tolerance decreases for the strong states. Public favor, in the strong states, for the war reduces as the length of the conflict continues. Additionally, conflicts resolved prior to hostilities favor the strong (threats may be made, overwhelming military capacity, etc.). Conflicts resolved after the initiation of hostilities favor the strong when land and governance are the ultimate aims and favor the weak when policy change is the ultimate aim. Underestimating the cost of war by the strong leads to an increased chance of success for the weak.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Sullivan, "Who Wins?"

⁵⁹ Ibid.




Figure 1. Typology of Political Objectives⁶⁰

B. ADOPTION OF AN INDIRECT STRATEGY

In order for Lebanon and specifically the LAF to counter Hizbullah's efforts, Lebanon must adopt an indirect strategy against Hizbullah. Lebanon must make the benefits of disbanding Hizbullah's militant wing outweigh the costs of maintaining the wing. The government and the LAF need to focus their efforts on developing and implementing a military, political and social services strategy attacking Hizbullah through indirect efforts. Hizbullah is deeply imbedded in the political framework of the Lebanese government and it gains more support during every election. Hizbullah realized the organization is more effective when a political strategy is employed against the Lebanese government. The social services section is effective and responsive in times of need for the Lebanese population, especially the Shi'a Muslims. The weakest link to the organization and the one where the greatest strides could be made is the military wing.

⁶⁰ Sullivan, "Who Wins?"

Hizbullah is not going to attempt to undertake direct action against the LAF; they do not possess the necessary assets and this is counterproductive to achieving their political and jihadist aims.

The following section explains some of the areas of concern with direct and indirect action undertaken by the LAF, Hizbullah and U.S. FID efforts. A direct action is one the Lebanese government, LAF, or U.S. FID efforts would undertake expressly against Hizbullah. An indirect action is one the Lebanese government, LAF, or U.S. FID efforts could undertake against Hizbullah using the population, allies or international community.

1. Lebanese Armed Forces' Direct Approach

Lebanon must provide better social services and infrastructure to the Shi'a minority in southern Lebanon. The LAF needs to work in synchronization with the economic efforts of the government in order to provide for a better standard of living. If the government can provide these services and take away the base of support for Hizbullah, there is an increased chance Hizbullah will lose legitimacy and relevancy.

The LAF must provide increased military security in the southern border areas with Israel. Hizbullah is currently providing this security. The LAF must reduce the popular support Hizbullah receives from the population based on the security it provides. Israel has stated publically it would remove its forces from the security zone if the LAF assumes the security role from Hizbullah. Additionally, the Lebanese government must overcome its own political system's shortcomings to deal with these internal security threats.⁶¹

2. Lebanese Armed Forces' Indirect Approach

The U.S. FID program needs to address national issues and work closely with the host-nation's IDAD strategy. The strategy needs to anticipate, preclude

⁶¹ Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense*, (Washington DC: Government Publishing Office, 2010), II-1.

and counter threats and address the root cause of instability.⁶² These programs need to include the efforts and resources of local and foreign militaries, non-governmental organizations and law enforcement agencies. The IDAD approach revolves around undermining the adversary's political strength first, and its military might second. Gaining popular support is vital for the successful implementation and completion of the strategy.⁶³

Vital to this indirect approach is the development of psychological operations (PSYOPs) and public affairs departments to get the country's message out to the local population—Hizbullah is a terrorist organization, the militant wing is detrimental to the safety and security of the country and the government is going to assist in the rebuilding and management of the country.

Increasing the amount of non-lethal aid, such as money, materiel, humanitarian efforts, liaisons, technological experts, etc., to the military, government and population will improve the effectiveness of all aspects of the military and governance apparatus within Lebanon. Additional levels of increased security assistance—multinational education, multinational training, counternarcotics assistance, defense and military contracts, defense support to public diplomacy, facilities and infrastructure projects will also have a profound advantage on the effectiveness of the Lebanese government.⁶⁴

3. Hizbullah Direct Approach

Hizbullah is a prominent fixture within Lebanese society and the Levant. Its paramilitary wing is strong and effective and it could attack the LAF directly. However, this is not a plausible or feasible option for Hizbullah. It is counter-productive to their agenda. Iran and Syria could offer more money and material and even openly assist Hizbullah in attacking the LAF. This is also not likely to occur. Lebanon is an ally of the United States and other Western countries. It is

⁶² Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Pub 3-22*, IX.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, II-1.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, I-11.

not in the best national interests of Iran or Syria to engage in a military conflict with the United States and its allies due to the high cost of blood and treasure which would be expended.

Hizbullah's direct approach against the LAF and Lebanese government would be intimately linked to Syria and Iran. Lebanon used to be included in the territory controlled by Syria. Because of this, Syria still has a vested interest in Lebanon's national and international activities. If the al-Asad regime should fall, Hizbullah would lose a powerful ally in the region as well as a significant portion of its financial support. Iran also has a vested interest in the Syrian regime not failing. Iran's revolution was exported in 1980s and was instrumental in the creation of Hizbullah. Iran would have a much more difficult time in supporting Hizbullah if they become cut off from Syria.

4. Hizbullah Indirect Approach

Hizbullah has been operating indirectly since its creation over 30 years ago. One of the crucial factors in Hizbullah's continued success is its excellent social services branch. The Shi'a minority areas in southern Lebanon were mismanaged, financially underdeveloped and lacking in suitable infrastructure during and after the Lebanese civil war. The social services provided by Hizbullah in the early 1980s were critical in cementing its authority and legitimacy in the region.

Hizbullah continues to receive monetary and military support from Syria and Iran. This money is one of the primary sources of income for the organization and is used to fund all areas of operation including the social services branch.

5. U.S. FID Efforts Direct Approach

Host nation commanders, including LAF commanders, are concerned with the number of men that can be trained and the training resources U.S. forces provide. Because of this, local forces are usually trained in marksmanship, close

quarters battle, communication between elements, long-range target interdiction, medical support and evacuation, leadership training, operations planning and orders production.

FID is core task of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), but can be accomplished by conventional forces. U.S. forces generally develop lethal training packages to instruct foreign forces. These training approaches are excellent for conventional armies to wage war against each other. This training approach is not suited to training foreign armies to defeat non-traditional, non-state, or terrorist adversaries.

6. U.S. FID Efforts Indirect Approach

The most important focus for an indirect approach is the population. Hizbullah has a robust social services section. FID and IDAD efforts need to address these issues. Lebanon needs to provide more DIME support to vital areas such as schools, roads, access to clean water, better economic advancement, louder voice in the local leadership and greater input in national politics. The U.S. should provide initial funding and economic development and aid packages. These finite aid packages can be used to initiate Lebanese efforts for stability and security.

The four IDAD functions—balanced development, security, neutralization and mobilization are essential in developing a complete indirect strategy. Each of these will be expanded upon in a following section. Additionally, the integration of multiple lines of effort from several different agencies, vertical between the levels of command and horizontal between United States government agencies, HN military and civilian organizations will complete the indirect strategy. The ultimate goal of an indirect FID and IDAD strategy is to build a viable political, economic, military and social institution necessary to respond to the needs of the society.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-22*, II-1.

C. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The IDAD program is the government's basis for security assistance, FID and any other actions undertaken by the U.S. government on behalf of a HN. The IDAD program coupled with a strong FID program conducted by competent and prepared military elements and agencies will provide the necessary combination of military and non-military efforts to combat an insurgent or criminal element. The IDAD program uses four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats. These functions are depicted in Figure 2. JP 3-22 states balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, economic and social programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem. Security includes all activities implemented to protect the populace from violence and to provide a safe environment for natural development. Neutralization is a political concept that makes an insurgent irrelevant to the political process, is the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the populace, can involve arrest and prosecution and can involve combat action when the adversaries' violent actions escalate. All neutralization efforts must be legal. This is essential for humanitarian reasons and to reinforce the legitimacy of the government. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and it includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support for the government.⁶⁶

Since every situation is unique, the four functional areas are combined with specific principles to guide the efforts necessary to defeat an internal threat. These principles include: unity of effort, intelligence, civil military operations (CMO), PSYOPs, a minimum use of force, a responsive government and

⁶⁶ Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-22*, II-1-II-2.

strategic communication.⁶⁷ The principles are depicted in Figure 2. Lebanon and its allies should use these principles, coupled with the IDAD functions, to form a comprehensive indirect strategy to counter Hizbullah.

The functional areas and principles are outlined below with specific ideas towards Lebanon and Hizbullah.

⁶⁷ Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-22*, II-4-II-5.




Figure 2. Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model (JP 3-22)⁶⁸

1. IDAD Functions and an Indirect Approach

In order for a nation to be successful in implementing the balanced development function, it must incorporate the population into essential areas of political, economic and social decision making. The government needs to elicit

⁶⁸ Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-22*, II-2.

ideas and recommendations from scholars, persons with technological backgrounds, scientists and economists for ways to increase productivity, quality-of-life infrastructure and reduce fraud, waste and abuse of resources. The conditions contributing to the internal threat of Lebanon need to be identified and neutralized. The conditions making the society vulnerable need to be corrected so the society can advance as a whole.⁶⁹

Essential to the security function is the protection of the population and the state's ability to provide a safe and secure environment for national development.⁷⁰ Lebanon and the LAF need to increase the physical security within the government and military. While increasing these efforts, the government must also undermine the security efforts of Hizbullah throughout southern Lebanon and especially in the security zone separating Lebanon and Israel. The government and the LAF need to prove to the population and especially the Shi'a Muslims, that safety is the utmost concern and priority. The transition to LAF security in the region is critical. Any lapse in security could lead to border altercations between Lebanon and Israel.

In order for the neutralization function to be effective, the Lebanese government needs to render the military wing of Hizbullah irrelevant through increased training and employment of the LAF. The government must prove to the population, through the use of PSYOPs, diplomatic alliances with the U.S. and other key allies within the Levant and Middle East and strategic messaging, Hizbullah is irrelevant within Lebanon. The organization is nothing more than a criminal enterprise that does not have the best interests of the state in its sights.

Mobilization is the most time sensitive of the IDAD functions. Lebanon must provide materiel to the population, or develop means and systems to acquire the necessary logistics to combat Hizbullah. Weapons and war stocks are important, but engineer and humanitarian assets are also vital to minimize

⁶⁹ Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-22*, II-2-II-3.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, II-3.

the efforts and necessity of Hizbullah. The government, in order to be effective needs to provide a faster and more complete government response to conflict, natural disaster and national growth than Hizbullah does in southern Lebanon and for the minority Shi'a population.

2. IDAD Principles and an Indirect Approach

The unity of effort principle is difficult in Lebanon. Lebanon has a confessionalism-based government. While there are three major religious groups—Maronite Christians and Sunni and Shi'a Muslims vying for power in Lebanon—Lebanese law recognizes 18 distinct confessional groups, each with corporate group rights. The religious, political, military and business leaders must come to an accord with regards to the national development of the country. What is in the best interest of individuals may not be in the best interest of the community. The unity of effort is essential in developing Lebanon, denying Hizbullah its support from Syria and Iran and ultimately rendering Hizbullah ineffective.

All levels of governance and defense require the maximum use of intelligence. This intelligence ensures the government stays abreast of Hizbullah's efforts. The intelligence allows the government to make timely and accurate decisions for the population and the state. The intelligence ensures the government is prepared to respond to a crisis and deploy the appropriate assets to any areas troubled by disaster, war, or other hardship.

CMO and PSYOPs are critical in undermining Hizbullah's social services section and providing an increased legitimacy for and dependence upon, the Lebanese government. CMO must be increased to provide the basic social services needed by the local population. Access to fresh water, jobs, education and medical facilities are essential in swaying the popular support from Hizbullah towards the government. CMO must be carefully thought out, because Hizbullah has an advantage with its social services division. Specifically, it can be argued that social services and charity are a binding act within the Zakat pillar of Islam

and CMO are mandated by national interests; Hizbullah operates with complete freedom because they are part of a legitimate government, but also part of a quasi-terrorist organization and most importantly Hizbullah's social service section is already integrated into Lebanese society. PSYOPs should be employed to discredit the actions of Hizbullah's social service section in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley. PSYOPs can be used effectively in showcasing the advancements of the Lebanese government and LAF along with the national development projects undertaken with its allies. Additionally, an effective PSYOPs campaign can be used to discredit the efforts of foreign nations such as Syria and Iran.

A minimum use of force in certain circumstances produces a far greater effect than a large conventional military or law enforcement response. The security zone in southern Lebanon is a hotly-contested region and has been for more than thirty years. The LAF need to develop force packages that employ the maximum amount of PSYOPs, CMO, medical and engineer personnel and limit the number of combat troops. Limiting the combat personnel to only those needed to safely secure the border will reduce tensions between Lebanon and Israel, ultimately discrediting the large militant wing Hizbullah maintains in the region for that purpose.

A responsive government is vital for the stability and development of a state. The Lebanese government needs to increase its responsiveness and efficiency towards its population. In order to discredit and reduce the actions of Hizbullah the Lebanese government needs to become more decisive and reduce the bureaucratic hindrances plaguing it. The government must listen to the population and provide for their needs.

The Lebanese government and LAF need to develop a strategic communication plan and ensure it is delivered throughout the country. Hizbullah runs its own television station, al-Manar television and it is effective in broadcasting its message to the Shi'a population especially in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government must discredit Hizbullah's message and implement its

own national message complete with themes, reconstruction updates, national development strategies, partnerships with global commerce, diplomacy, etc.

D. CONCLUSION

Implementing an indirect approach is likely the only way that Lebanon can succeed in discrediting and eventually taming Hizbullah so its militant wing can be rendered ineffective and disarmed. The United States can greatly assist the Lebanese government and LAF through the development and implementation of a comprehensive IDAD and FID strategy. The policy needs to center around the population, especially the Shi'a Muslim population in southern Lebanon. The policy also needs to focus on unity of effort, separating the Lebanese government from governments that support Hizbullah and providing the Lebanese with the global resources necessary to advance national objectives. The initial goal is to discredit Hizbullah and render them ineffective throughout Lebanon and the region. Additionally, the base of support for Hizbullah needs to be controlled by the national government. Their basic and advanced needs should be the primary short-term goal of the government. If Hizbullah loses its base of support then the government can continue its indirect strategy of dismantling and defeating the organization.

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IV. INDIRECT APPROACH CASE STUDIES

This chapter examines two case studies where an indirect approach was used to combat an adversary. The first case study examines the indirect approaches the British government used in its efforts to bring peace to Northern Ireland and defeat the IRA. The second case study examines the United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) and VSO in Afghanistan. Both case studies provide background information on the indirect approaches used to combat the threats posed by the IRA in Northern Ireland and Taliban in Afghanistan.

A. BRITAIN AND IRELAND

1. Background Information

The island of Ireland was ruled by neighboring Britain for many hundreds of years. English settlers were planted on the island in an attempt to pacify the Irish. Many of these settlers, wealthy Protestants, received large plots of land and subjugated the local Catholic population.⁷¹ According to Thomas H. Henriksen, “The use of settlers to stabilize unruly regions is a time-polished practice seen in lands around the world.”⁷² Louise Richardson says, “The Act of Union of 1800 united Britain and Ireland in the United Kingdom, but many Irish people resisted the union both peacefully and violently throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century.”⁷³ After World War I, the British government passed the Government of Ireland Act of 1922, establishing two states in Ireland.⁷⁴ The South eventually severed ties with Britain and declared independence in 1947.⁷⁵ The struggle for

⁷¹ Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” in *Democracy and Counter Terrorism, Lessons From the Past*, ed. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, 63–105 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 65.

⁷² Thomas H. Henriksen, *What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency: Revision and Revelation*, Joint Special Operations University Report 08–5 (Tampa, FL: The Joint Special Operations University Press, 2008), 9.

⁷³ Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 65.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

sovereignty pursued two paths—one through the parliament and constitution, the other through underground revolution—ultimately leading Ireland into a bloody decades long conflict.⁷⁶

In the 1960s a Catholic middle class emerged in Ireland. Inspired by the U.S. Civil Rights movement, they tried to effect change within the governmental apparatus.⁷⁷ The Protestants saw the civil rights movement as an attack on the state and moved to defend itself.⁷⁸ The Lord Cameron committee investigated and reported on the causes of the civil disturbances in the 1960s, finding a rising sense of injustice and grievance among the minority Catholics in public housing allocation, local government appointments and manipulation of local elections against them.⁷⁹ Henriksen writes, “It is impossible to escape the conclusions drawn from many reports and commissions that widespread discrimination existed in Northern Ireland.”⁸⁰ In 1969, the British government deployed troops to Northern Ireland in defense of civil power to restore order.⁸¹ In 1972 the British government dissolved the Stormont Parliament due to inefficiency and its inability to reform itself and Britain ruled Northern Ireland directly from Westminster until 1998.⁸²

2. Growth of the Irish Republican Army

The deployment of British troops to Northern Ireland did not stem the violence and civil unrest. The troops were required to assist the local authorities with enforcing the laws, laws which the Catholics viewed as Protestant in nature.⁸³ Due to this, the arrival of the British troops enormously assisted the

⁷⁶ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 12.

⁷⁷ Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 66.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁷⁹ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 18.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁸¹ Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 66.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 66.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 68.

growth of the IRA.⁸⁴ Additionally, due to the atrocities of the police, (the notorious B Specials⁸⁵) and in response to the marauding mobs, Catholics barricaded themselves into “no-go” areas to keep the security forces out, allowing the IRA to organize openly.⁸⁶ The IRA continued to openly grow and become more defiant based on other heavy-handed approaches taken by the British troops and local police authorities. Some of these approaches included: imposing curfews, weapons searches exclusively in Catholic neighborhoods, ransacking homes, humiliating automobile occupants during searches and harassment of pedestrians on the streets.⁸⁷ The Commission of Human Rights ruled on January 18, 1978 that five interrogation techniques were used on members of the IRA.⁸⁸ The commission found the techniques were a practice of inhumane and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention of Human Rights, but did not constitute a practice of torture within the meaning of the Article.⁸⁹ Richardson writes, “These techniques might not be too bad for a hardened military activist, but to the regular civilians on whom they were most often used, they were terrifying.”⁹⁰ The last vestige of credibility was removed from the British when the Widgery Tribunal exonerated the soldiers involved in the Bloody Sunday massacre on January 30, 1972, where 13 Catholics were killed by British soldiers.⁹¹ The popularity of the IRA was not consistent. The pattern fluctuated throughout the conflict with membership rising after a British atrocity and falling after an IRA atrocity.⁹²

⁸⁴ Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 68.

⁸⁵ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 21.

⁸⁶ Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 69.

⁸⁷ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 22.

⁸⁸ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 438.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 438.

⁹⁰ Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 86.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 70.

3. British Approach to Defeating the Insurgency in Northern Ireland

Following the events of Bloody Sunday, the British needed to re-evaluate their counterinsurgency strategy against the IRA. The British completely changed their strategy from a heavy-handed approach to a softer one, touting a stability-by-civility approach.⁹³ Henriksen quotes the noted military author Martin van Creveld saying, "The real secret behind the British success: extreme self-control."⁹⁴ Henriksen also said, "Britain's non-military response to the paramilitary violence played *the* major role in the eventual pacification."⁹⁵ Richardson writes, "While British policy on the surface often appears reactive and inconsistent, both Labour and Conservative governments have consistently adhered to a set of basic principles. The first and most important goal has been to restore order; the second, to ensure conditions that enable that order to be maintained."⁹⁶

The British focused on four areas for their indirect strategy against the IRA in an attempt to reign in the violence and restore order and governance to Northern Ireland. The British focused on local government, jobs, housing and community relations and education.⁹⁷ Britain suspended the Stormont Parliament and directly ruled Northern Ireland.⁹⁸ With London running the local government directly, the political process and resources reached the minority Christians, social services and social-services entitlements increased, healthcare and unemployment benefits increased and the Protestants also benefited from the

⁹³ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 27.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 29.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 30.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 75..

⁹⁷ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 30.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 31.

increased revenue and services distributed from London.⁹⁹ Additionally, imprisoned IRA members were elected to seats in Parliament increasing the benefits and political ends for the Catholics.¹⁰⁰

According to Henriksen, “It was the discriminatory allocation of housing by local authorities that spurred the civil rights protests in the late 1960s.”¹⁰¹ The British government established a centralized housing authority, the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE).¹⁰² The NIHE “embodied the mission of eliminating the grounds for complaints in order to reduce the bias of underlying disaffection ‘beyond violence and ensure future viability and well-being’.”¹⁰³ NIHE became the United Kingdom’s first comprehensive housing authority and had a substantial impact in Northern Ireland increasing the availability of housing for Catholics and Protestants alike.¹⁰⁴

Britain established the Fair Employment Act in 1976 in an effort to combat unemployment, which hovered around 14 percent.¹⁰⁵ The Fair Employment Act imposed no formal quotas, but it did strengthen hiring practices throughout the country eventually increasing Christian employment to pre-Troubles period numbers.¹⁰⁶ The implementation of fairer employment opportunities increased the revenue and economic base for the entire country and not just the Christian population. The creation of jobs put people to work and lessened inter-sectarian violence.¹⁰⁷

⁹⁹ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 31.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 33.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 34.

¹⁰² Ibid., 34.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 34.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 35.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 36.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 36–37.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 38.

The British government also implemented drastic reform in the areas of community relations and education. The goal in increasing community relations was to bring the local religious populations together, foster tolerance and cultural pluralism and establish contacts between them.¹⁰⁸ In 1990, the Northern Ireland Community Relations Council was established within the office of the Secretary of Northern Ireland, to nurture equal opportunity and assist in the passage of educational reforms.¹⁰⁹ Some of these educational reforms included the establishment of religiously integrated schools, ensuring teachers understand their responsibility to help children understand and respect each other and provide access to higher education.¹¹⁰

The British government increased their public relations campaign within Northern Ireland proving Protestants and Catholics are benefiting from the increased peace and attention placed on the four critical areas identified in the soft approach against terrorism. The economic base increased. The availability of housing increased. Advances in healthcare increased. These increases were beneficial in reducing the violence and bringing the IRA to a complete disarmament after the attacks of 9–11 (along with the new political climate within the U.S. government and its stance on terrorism).¹¹¹

Additional indirect approaches the British government used to combat the terrorist adversary operating in Northern Ireland included demilitarizing the local security forces. The local security forces were mostly Protestant and never gained the trust of the Catholics.¹¹² In addition to demilitarizing the security forces, the British government moved forward with their political public relations campaigns to de-politicize and criminalize the terrorists.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 39.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹¹² Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," 80.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 80.

Richardson claims, “The most important weapon in any campaign against terrorism is intelligence.”¹¹⁴ The British used interrogation techniques in their attempt to quell the violence. In addition to the questioning, many Catholics were imprisoned without trial. There was a belief that convictions could not be won in trials, so the government moved to internment without trial.¹¹⁵ Outrage increased as initially only Catholics were imprisoned and became even stronger when it was determined that those interned had nothing to do with the IRA.¹¹⁶ According to Henriksen, the policy of internment without trial was “narrowly effective, but widely controversial,” with the immediate gains it generated backfiring on the officials.¹¹⁷

Another example of an indirect approach included opening dialogue with the terrorists. Most countries adopt a policy of no negotiation with terrorists.¹¹⁸ Reasons for this include demonstrating that terrorism will not be rewarded, demonstrating repugnance for the terrorists and insisting on maintaining a moral distance between the government and terrorists.¹¹⁹ The official policy of the British government included no negotiations, but in reality, talks were ongoing throughout the conflict.¹²⁰ The negotiations and associated cease-fires were used to gather intelligence on both sides and determine what grievances could be addressed to eliminate violence and move the countries forward economically, politically and socially.

Critical to the British success in Northern Ireland were the reduction of heavy-handed military approaches to the violence, increased communication between both parties towards an agreed upon peace settlement, and economic

¹¹⁴ Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 82.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹¹⁷ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 24.

¹¹⁸ Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 91.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 91.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 91.

and social advances in jobs, housing and education. All of these factors were intertwined and vital for the success of the British. The initial military and security approach were violent and created more IRA and enemies of the state than it eliminated. Henriksen writes, “By addressing the roots of Catholic discontent and discrimination, British governments siphoned off enough anger, enticed enough collaborators and neutralized enough opposition that it undermined much of the minority’s support for IRA violence and led to a peaceful political resolution.”¹²¹

B. AFGHANISTAN AND VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

1. Background Information

In his paper “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency,” Seth Jones discusses in his introduction the fall of the Taliban and the rise of its insurgency. He states in 2001 a force of approximately 100 Central Intelligence Agency officers, 350 USSF soldiers and 15,000 Afghans overthrew the Taliban regime in less than three months.¹²² The initial success transitions into a full insurgency in 2006 as the Taliban attempted to overthrow the Afghan government.¹²³ Jones writes, “Scholars have argued that insurgencies usually begin because of grievances among ethnic groups or greed.”¹²⁴ Jones argues the pre-condition for the onset of the insurgency was structural—the collapse of the governance after the overthrow of the Taliban regime.¹²⁵ He continues saying the insurgency took advantage of the government being unable to provide basic services and goods, its weak security forces and the gap unfilled by international forces.¹²⁶

Scott Mann conducted a video interview on October 3, 2012 and discussed the Special Operations Forces (SOF) lessons learned from the

¹²¹ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 47.

¹²² Seth Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency,” *International Security* 32, no 4 (Spring 2008): 7.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

Afghanistan VSO program. In his opening remarks, Mann said the emphasis from 2003-2009 was on targeting Taliban leadership and forces, conducting small-scale “old school” SOF operations in villages and bringing governance, economic development and security to the country from the highest levels of government to the rural populations (a top-down, macro approach).¹²⁷ Mann iterates Seth Jones’ assessment the top-down approach is ill-suited for Afghanistan and never worked in the history of Afghanistan except for the reign of the Iron Amir, Abdur Rahman Khan from 1880–1901.¹²⁸

Mann gave a verbal history of Afghanistan in his interview, with discussion on the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, the Musahiban Dynasty (1929–1978) and the current insurgency stemming from predominantly rural Pashtun areas. He stated the ethnic Pashtuns comprise the majority of the rural populations and the bulk of the insurgency. These rural Pashtuns had been displaced and killed by the millions during the Soviet occupation and the continued conflicts within the current war. Because of this, the tribal elders who formed the Jirga (a tribal council) are unable to conduct their traditional roles of feudal lords, judges and educators.

Mann discussed the Musahiban Dynasty. He said this was a period of security and prosperity for Afghanistan. He claims the reason for this was the central government and the local Jirgas had an understanding between them. The central government would provide resources and state guidance to the whole country. The Jirgas agreed to this, but they were also able to govern themselves independently of the central government based on the traditional feudal systems and rural tribal codes. The rural populations settled feuds, distributed knowledge, supplies, resources and they protected themselves from threats both inside and outside their tribes. The Jirga had a standing body of

¹²⁷ Scott Mann, “Special Operations Forces Lessons Learned Afghanistan Village Stability Operations,” recorded October 3. 2012, DVD.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

young men called the Arbakai. These men were sons of the elders, enforced the decisions of the elders in the Jirga and defended the villages as an ad-hoc militia against enemies.

This agreement worked throughout the dynasty, but not after the Soviet invasion. The elders were either killed or displaced to other areas foreign to them. After the U.S. led overthrow of the Taliban, the villages and elders did not return to the same agreement with the central government. Kabul wanted to rule from the center and the U.S. led efforts encouraged this form of government and security. This did not work for the local villages. Services and support did not reach the villages. The Taliban saw the void, the lawlessness and the lack of elder leadership. The Taliban moved into the villages and took over implementing a Sharia (religious) based system of law which was opposite from the traditional norms. According to Dr. Irdi, “elders will not return to power on their own. A third party is needed to bring them back to power. Security and governance are necessary for them to step back into power.”¹²⁹

Throughout the mid and late 2000s the Taliban increased its stranglehold on the rural Afghan population and the central government was unable to stop its progress. The top-down, or formal approach to governance was not working in the rural areas. Targeting of Taliban leadership and forces was not addressing the problems of security and stability. The VSO program was developed to address the issues of stability in the rural villages.

2. The Village Stability Operations Program

The VSO program underwent several evolutions prior to its current (and evolving) form. The program has three lines of effort—a bottom-up approach, a focus on security, economic development and governance and achieve an enduring balance of stability between top and bottom (central government in Kabul and rural villages).¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Mann, “SOF Lessons Learned.”

¹³⁰ Ibid.

The VSO methodology is divided into four phases: shape, hold, build and transition.¹³¹ The shape phase is focused on gaining entry into the village with three measures of success: SOF are able to help defend the village, SOF are postured to oversee all their operations and the Afghan villagers view SOF as welcomed guests of their village.¹³² The hold phase is focused on stabilizing the village: security, economic development, expansion of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and increasing governance with a return to the traditional Jirga.¹³³ When the bottom up lines of operation of security, economic development and governance are reached in the hold phase then the village is stable.¹³⁴ The focus of the build phase is to connect the recently stabilized village to the local Afghan government in the district.¹³⁵ The last phase, the transition phase, occurs when the top down and bottom up approaches for the village and the central Afghan government meet and are stable. VSO transition must be effects-based and tied to the capacity of traditional village level institutions as well as the capacity of the village and central government to connect in an enduring fashion at the district and provincial levels.¹³⁶

The VSO program remembers the problems of the local systems that are degraded or destroyed. The root causes of instability are not tied to the government's inability to provide resources. The root causes at the local level are their current inability to provide resources and conflict resolution, areas historically vital to the stability and growth of the rural villages. The absence of these systems has been supplanted by the Islamists who use Sharia based law to rule.

¹³¹ Scott Mann, "Village Stability Operations-101, Understanding USSOCOM's Role in VSO and ALP in Afghanistan and Beyond," *The Donovan Review*, 2nd Ed. (2012), 17.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 18.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 19–22.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

3. Indirect Approach Lessons Learned from VSO

Several lessons have been learned from using an indirect approach through VSO to combat the Taliban insurgency. First, the U.S. and its allies have tried the top-down formal approach for a decade with little success. The VSO program and its bottom-up approach have been more successful in bringing relative stability to the rural regions. Second, the pace of communications between the villages and the central government needs to be faster than the communications of the Taliban. Third, the VSO and FID methodology are a continuum of the full spectrum of conflict, rather than an episodic approach to victory, meaning VSO and FID are part of the solution and not solely the solution. Fourth, the insurgents need to be rendered illegitimate. It is easier to accomplish this than it would be to defeat or destroy them. If the credibility of the insurgents is removed from the population, they lose their base of support and then can be removed from the villages.¹³⁷

Additional lessons learned include taking more time to understand the area, people and cultures where we operate. Living and working side by side with the Afghan population is also crucial in maintaining legitimacy and credibility with them. Economic development in the country needs to come out of the vacuum that it is currently in. All elements of national power that are working in this area need to talk and share ideas, so the correct projects and developments are instituted. What is good for Kabul is not a one size fits all approach for the rural villages and their form of Jirga governance.¹³⁸ The Afghan people need to stand up for themselves and not be intimidated by the Taliban. As the Taliban is reduced, intimidation from them could increase. It is vital the U.S. and its allies stand by the Afghan people during this time.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Mann, "SOF Lessons Learned."

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Mann, "VSO-101," 28.

C. CONCLUSION

The use of extreme or heavy-handed measures is not always sufficient to defeat a small-scale or determined adversary. The British have learned this throughout the years, developing specialized units to conduct counterinsurgency operations throughout the world most notably in Northern Ireland and Malaya. British adaptability stemmed from the conditions its counterinsurgency forces faced. Limited resources and the need to fight smarter than their enemy was the key rather than reliance on massive amounts of firepower.¹⁴⁰ The deployment of large-scale forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations may not be necessary. According to Richardson, “A professional and well-trained military may be too much of a blunt instrument when deployed in a civilian context”.¹⁴¹

In Afghanistan, the large military footprint of the International Security Assistance Force is capable and adequate in some respects, but also undermines the Afghan government and ultimately U.S. efforts. The formal, whole of government approach, is not sufficient if there is no stability in the rural villages where the Taliban reside and thrive. The VSO program intricately and adequately addresses the root causes of the insurgency and the inability of the central government to provide for the return of the traditional government.

Counterinsurgency forces and traditional armies need to adapt themselves to an ever-changing environment. If a heavy-handed approach is too blunt for the situation, a softer, indirect approach is required to neutralize the threat. Learning from past conflicts is an excellent way to garner ideas and present options for success.

¹⁴⁰ Henriksen, *What Really Happened*, 4.

¹⁴¹ Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 77.

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V. CONCLUSION

The United States of America came into existence because it waged an insurgency against a country that was superior in military strength, economic development and governance. Britain, being far superior, won many battles fighting the colonists. However, their massive military might could not win against the indirect approaches undertaken by the American colonies, participating in the South.

Sovereign nations need to address non-traditional threats and terrorist organizations through appropriate means. A massive military strike or heavy handed approach may be unacceptable in world opinion and ineffective against the threat. Lebanon is no different. A heavy-handed approach against Hizbullah is counterproductive. Understanding the current threat environment within Lebanon and the Levant area, as well as the global threat environment, will allow Lebanon and its allies to develop a comprehensive indirect approach against their terrorist adversary.

Parallels can be drawn from the two case studies to inform Lebanese policy. The British did not defeat the IRA, but they were successful in disarming the organization. Lebanon can do the same with Hizbullah. The organization is deeply rooted in Lebanese society. Hizbullah's militant wing can be rendered ineffective by the government and disarmed. A grand political deal will have to be forged between the government and Hizbullah. Without a political deal it is doubtful that the Lebanese government will be successful. Disarming Hizbullah will take time and resources, but it can be accomplished by following similar strategies other nations have used successfully.

In Afghanistan, the VSO program may be successful after the U.S. withdrawal if the ALPs are properly trained and equipped. The ALPs have to grow at a steady rate. Using the training and equipment they received from the international security force and especially USSF, the ALP will be able to maintain

security and stability within the rural villages. The coordination between the ALP and the local elders on the Shura will be crucial for the success of the VSO program after the U.S. withdrawal. The LAF can accomplish the same goals in Lebanon taking advantage of the assistance it receives from U.S. FID training and other international support. The LAF will have to maintain their security posture and continue to train new soldiers. The Lebanese government also needs to ask for international assistance and implement the proper strategies to combat Hizbullah. Close coordination between the LAF, local law enforcement and the government will ensure the proper resources and efforts are implemented to tame Hizbullah and provide for the population.

Using history as a guide, Lebanon may see how it can counter Hizbullah and undermine its bases of support. Lebanon must delegitimize Hizbullah and its military actions. The same was done in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan. The terrorists or insurgents need to be portrayed as incompetent thugs. Their actions need to be identified as criminal and counterproductive to the advancement of Lebanese society.

The government, supported by the military, needs to increase public spending and social services in the areas that need it most—poor, rural Shi'a centers. These centers are where Hizbullah garners the majority of its public support. Money received by Hizbullah from Iran and other international support is used to advance a robust social services agenda within southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley. The Lebanese government must identify projects and areas of contention within the Shi'a minority areas. If immediate attention is paid to these projects, Hizbullah could be seen as uncommitted to the population and lose some of its support base. Similar to Northern Ireland, if Lebanon increases the spending and social services within the Shi'a areas it will have a positive effect on neighboring areas in terms of economic development and increased peace and stability.

The LAF need to identify an acceptable mixture of military and civilian control to provide security along the southern border with Israel. Hizbullah has

been the de facto guard along the border for decades. This increases the tensions between Lebanon and Israel and has led to many armed conflicts and wars throughout the years. A full-scale military deployment to southern Lebanon is not the right answer. The proper mixture of combat and combat support troops necessary to restore balance to the fragile and tumultuous border region is required.

The Lebanese government needs to increase its use of public relations, PSYOP and messaging. Hizbullah is adept in distributing its message, especially through its organization-run television station. The Lebanese government needs to counter Hizbullah's messaging and provide information, assistance and support through its own media channels.

The United States can assist Lebanon through sanctions on the countries that support Hizbullah, specifically Iran and Syria. The sanctions are necessary to maintain economic and developmental hardship on countries that assist and harbor terrorists.

U.S. efforts need to address all of these issues. It needs to focus all elements of national power that are resident within Lebanon. Military elements training with the LAF need to develop training plans which identify indirect methods for waging an irregular warfare campaign against Hizbullah. This IW centric FID plan needs to address the pertinent issues facing the LAF. Lessons learned from past conflicts where the population was the most important aspect of the conflict need to be studied and exploited. Britain and Northern Ireland are terrific examples; the U.S. action in Vietnam is not. Additionally the U.S. and its allies need to raise the stakes for Syria and Iran for continued support to Hizbullah.

Lebanon is a relatively new country and its struggle against Hizbullah has lasted too long. Lebanon needs to address the grievances of its minority population to increase economic development and offer more political opportunities. The LAF needs to secure the border region, provide stability to the

population and remove the need to have a militant wing within Hizbullah. These actions will take time, but can be accomplished with enough national will and international support.

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